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BEYOND ABSURDITY: CLIMATE REGULATION AND
THE CASE FOR RESTRICTING THE ABSURD RESULTS
DOCTRINE
Katherine Kirklin O’Brien
Abstract: The absurd results doctrine of statutory interpretation allows courts to depart
from clear legislative text when a literal reading would be “absurd.” Traditionally, courts
defined an absurd result as one that offends fundamental social values. Over time, however,
courts have expanded the concept of legal absurdity to include outcomes that do not violate
moral principles, but instead present regulatory burdens deemed too onerous to reflect
congressional intent. In June 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
invoked this expansive reading of the absurd results doctrine to support a regulation known
as the “Tailoring Rule,” which the agency promulgated as part of its first effort to regulate
climate-changing greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA explicitly
states that facilities emitting any regulated air pollutant in excess of specific quantities must
obtain a permit from the EPA or authorized state agencies. The Tailoring Rule, however,
raises the statutory permitting threshold for facilities that emit greenhouse gases, on the
ground that applying the existing thresholds to greenhouse gas emitters would be so
burdensome for the agency and industry as to constitute an absurd result. While the Tailoring
Rule illustrates the practical expediency of an expansive absurd results doctrine, it also
demonstrates the doctrine’s inconsistency with the constitutional separation of powers,
administrative law principles, and the mandate of federal environmental statutes. Focusing on
the example of environmental law and the Tailoring Rule in particular, this Comment argues
that courts should restrict the absurd results doctrine to its traditional scope and reject
arguments that a certain degree of congressionally mandated regulation is absurd as a matter
of law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Administrator concludes that . . . the case for finding that
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere endanger public health and
welfare is compelling and, indeed, overwhelming . . . . The
evidence points ineluctably to the conclusion that climate
change is upon us as a result of greenhouse gas
emissions . . . and that the effects will only worsen over time in
the absence of regulatory action. The effects of climate change
on public health include sickness and death . . . . The effects on
welfare embrace every category of effect described in the Clean
Air Act’s definition of “welfare” and, more broadly, virtually
every facet of the living world around us . . . . In both magnitude
and probability, climate change is an enormous problem. The
greenhouse gases that are responsible for it endanger public
health and welfare within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency1
“Absurd”:
ridiculously
unreasonable,
unsound,
or
incongruous . . . having no rational or orderly relationship to
human life: meaningless.
Merriam-Webster English Dictionary2
In June 2010, amid heated controversy over the federal government’s
response to climate change,3 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) published a regulation known as the “Tailoring Rule” as part of
its first efforts to regulate climate-changing greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act (CAA).4 As written, the CAA requires facilities that emit
1. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,904 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009).
2. Absurd Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/absurd (last visited July 9, 2011).
3. See GREGORY E. WANNIER, EPA’S IMPENDING GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS: DIGGING
THROUGH THE MORASS OF LITIGATION 2 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Climate Change Law,
Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=551014
(describing the EPA’s efforts to regulate greenhouse gases as “heavily contested” notwithstanding
“express Supreme Court authorization” to undertake such regulation).
4. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514 (Jun. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. The Tailoring Rule forms part of a suite of
rules promulgated by the EPA to address greenhouse gas emissions following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007), which held that greenhouse gases
fall within the CAA’s definition of “air pollutants” and may therefore be regulated under that
statute. See Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
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more than 100 or 250 tons per year of a conventional air pollutant5 to
obtain a permit from the EPA or authorized state agencies.6 The
Tailoring Rule, however, presents the EPA’s interpretation that this
threshold does not apply to emissions of greenhouse gases.7 Based on
this interpretation, the EPA substitutes a 100,000-tons-per-year threshold
for greenhouse gas emissions,8 effectively exempting sources that
produce less than 100,000 tons of greenhouse gases annually from
immediate compliance with the statute.9 A cursory glance at the rule

Tailoring Rule, Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf (last visited Sept.
13, 2011). For a history of the Tailoring Rule, see James R. Farrell, The Future of the Greenhouse
Gas Tailoring Rule, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,247, 10,249–51 (2011).
5. The CAA distinguishes conventional or “criteria” air pollutants from “hazardous” air
pollutants, which are regulated under a separate section of the statute. See Robert J. Martineau, Jr.,
Hazardous Air Pollutants, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 227 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. &
David P. Novello eds., 2d ed. 2004). Conventional pollutants include substances such as sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, and photochemical smog (also known as ground-level
ozone). See Richard E. Ayres & Mary Rose Kornreich, Setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 13 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello
eds., 2d ed. 2004). Hazardous air pollutants are known or suspected to cause cancer or other serious
health effects or have an adverse environmental effect. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, About Air Toxics,
TOXIC AIR POLLUTANTS (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/air/toxicair/newtoxics.html.
Examples of hazardous air pollutants include benzene, dioxin, and mercury. See id. The CAA
mandates a permit for facilities that emit more than ten tons per year of a single hazardous air
pollutant or twenty-five tons per year of any combination of such pollutants. Clean Air Act,
§ 112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2011).
6. The Tailoring Rule concerns two CAA permitting programs—the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and title V programs. Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,514. The PSD
program mandates permits for new or modified stationary (non-vehicle) sources of air pollutants
located in clean air areas that emit or have the potential to emit at least 100 tons per year of a
regulated pollutant and fall within twenty-eight specified categories. Id. at 31,520. New or modified
sources in clean air areas that do not fall within the specified categories require a permit if they emit
or have the potential to emit at least 250 tons per year of a regulated pollutant. Id. The title V
program mandates permits for, inter alia, any new or modified stationary source that emits or has
the potential to emit at least 100 tons per year of a regulated pollutant, regardless of the existing air
quality in the area in which it is located. Id. at 31,521; 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2011).
7. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,517.
8. See id. at 31,516.
9. The Tailoring Rule prescribes a two-part phase-in of permitting requirements for large sources
of greenhouse gases. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,516. In the first phase, the rule requires
sources that already hold a CAA permit to begin reporting their greenhouse gas emissions to the
EPA or state permitting authority. See id. The second phase requires currently unregulated facilities
to obtain a permit by July 1, 2011, if they emit more than 100,000 tons per year of greenhouse
gases. See id. The rule fully exempts certain smaller sources from greenhouse gas permitting
requirements until at least 2016. See id. While the EPA retains some flexibility to modify the
applicable threshold during the 2011 to 2016 period, it has guaranteed that no source that emits less
than 50,000 tons per year of greenhouse gases will be subject to regulation under the title V or PSD
programs during that period. See id. at 31,524–25. For a detailed summary of the rule’s application
to specific source types under the phase-in approach, see Farrell, supra note 4.
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raises the question: how can an agency “interpret” a statute so as to
revise the permitting requirements numerically expressed in its text?
The EPA’s answer rests in part on the “absurd results” doctrine,10 a
canon of statutory interpretation that has been “a staple of American
legal culture since the founding.”11 As traditionally understood, the
doctrine justifies a court’s departure from the plain meaning of a statute
when applying the statute literally would contravene fundamental social
values and common sense.12 As the Tailoring Rule illustrates, however,
agencies now invoke the doctrine to justify their departure from facially
clear statutory language13 when applying the statute as written would
present unmanageable regulatory burdens.14 Under this expansive view
of the doctrine, a judge may declare a literal statutory interpretation
absurd, thereby rendering the provision inapplicable, on the ground that
it affects an overly broad set of actors or that its mandate would be too
burdensome to implement.15
The Tailoring Rule marks the outer bounds of the contemporary
absurd results doctrine. The EPA’s justification for revising the CAA’s
permitting thresholds is that greenhouse gases, unlike other regulated
pollutants, are produced by hundreds of thousands of small entities in
quantities exceeding the 100/250-tons-per-year threshold prescribed in
10. Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,516. The agency also cites the “administrative necessity”
and “one-step-at-a-time” doctrines to support the rule. Id.
11. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 85
(2010).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486–87 (1868); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202–03 (1819).
13. Under the familiar framework for agency statutory interpretation laid out in Chevron, U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, an agency may adopt an independent construction of a
statute only if the statute is ambiguous on its face. See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Where the
statutory language is clear, its plain meaning controls. See id.; see also infra notes 136–141 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2001)
(accepting EPA’s argument that reading § 303(d)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) literally
would contravene congressional intent and therefore lead to absurd results); Am. Water Works
Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (accepting EPA’s argument that petitioner’s
interpretation of the Safe Drinking Water Act would lead to absurd results); see also MANNING &
STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 98 (distinguishing “classic” absurd results cases such as Kirby from
more contemporary decisions in which the court rejected statutory text not because its literal
application would “violate some deeply and widely held social value,” but instead because of the
court’s “assessment of what Congress would have intended, given the purposes of the bill and the
dynamics of Washington politics”).
15. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463–64 (1989) (holding that a
literal interpretation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act would be absurd on the ground that it
“would catch far more groups and consulting arrangements than Congress could conceivably have
intended”).
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the statute.16 As a result, the EPA estimated that applying the Act as
written to greenhouse gas emitters would make the statute’s permitting
programs several hundred-fold larger.17 While not disputing the CAA’s
applicability to greenhouse gas emissions,18 the agency concluded that
the sheer magnitude of regulation dictated by a literal application of the
statute, and the attendant burden on permitting authorities and industry,
constitutes an absurd result that Congress could not have intended.19
Therefore, the EPA concluded that the CAA does not require permits for
sources of greenhouse gases according to the thresholds prescribed in its
text.20
The expansive interpretation of absurd results adopted in the
Tailoring Rule magnifies a longstanding critique that the absurd results
doctrine allows executive and judicial actors to depart from statutory text
in contravention of the constitutional separation of powers.21 When an
administrative agency invokes the doctrine, it also circumvents the limits
on its interpretive discretion established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council22 by adopting an
independent construction of a facially clear statute.23 Moreover, because
16. See Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf (last visited Sept.
13, 2011).
17. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,533.
18. See id. at 31,517 (“[T]he PSD and title V provisions and their legislative history do indicate a
clear congressional intent . . . that the permitting programs do apply to GHG [greenhouse gas]
sources.”).
19. See id. at 31,533 (stating that applying the statutory permitting thresholds literally to sources
of greenhouse gases would make the PSD and title V programs “several hundred-fold larger than
what Congress appeared to contemplate” and would cover small sources that Congress did not
expect would require CAA permits).
20. See id.
21. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 267 (2009) (describing the argument that “judicial application of the absurdity
doctrine bumps up against the Founder[s’] commitment to the rule of law.”); John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2437 (2003) (“The absurdity doctrine, as traditionally
conceived, approximates the very judicial behavior that [the] separation-of-powers tradition
condemns.”). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 482 (1989) (advocating for the absurd results doctrine on the ground that courts possess
superior institutional competency, relative to Congress, for determining whether a specific
application of a general statutory provision is sound).
22. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. See id. at 842–44 (stating that a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it
administers will first ask whether congressional intent on the point at issue is clear and, if so, apply
that intent as expressed in the text. If, however, congressional intent is not clear, the court will
consider whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a permissible construction of the statute and
apply the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable.).
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the doctrine fails to provide stable criteria for defining and remedying a
purported absurdity,24 there is no clear limit to the statutory revisions it
could sanction.
These concerns are particularly acute in the context of contemporary
environmental law. In the absence of affirmative congressional action to
address climate change, litigants seeking redress for climate-related
harms are exerting new pressure on existing environmental statutes.25
Authorizing administrative and judicial interpretations that contravene
facially clear legislation under the banner of absurd results could
dismantle the regulatory machinery of federal environmental laws by
giving agencies and judges license to revise statutory mandates that they
deem overly onerous.
Focusing on the example of environmental law,26 this Comment
argues that courts should reject expanded application of the absurd
results doctrine as inconsistent with the separation of powers,
administrative law principles, and the mandate of federal environmental
statutes. Part I describes the traditional formulation of the absurd results
doctrine. Part II discusses how courts have expanded the concept of
absurd results beyond its traditional sphere. Part III tracks this expansion
in litigation under federal environmental statutes and highlights the
specific issues raised by those cases. Using the example of the Tailoring
Rule and the litigation challenging it,27 Part IV argues that courts should
24. See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 139 (1994) (noting that courts
applying the absurd results principle fail to define what constitutes an absurdity).
25. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (reviewing EPA’s denial of
rulemaking petition requesting that the agency regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under the CAA); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:09 CV
588, 2010 WL 1416681, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) (alleging, inter alia, violation of the
National Environmental Policy Act for failure to consider climate impacts in permitting
construction of coal-to-liquid fuel plant); Complaint at 2, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No.
2:09-cv-00670-JCC (W.D. Wash. filed May 14, 2009), 2009 WL 1390743 (alleging violations of
EPA’s duty under the CWA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions causing ocean acidification). For
an updated list of climate-related litigation, see Arnold & Porter LLP, Climate Change Litigation in
the U.S., http://www.climatecasechart.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
26. This Comment focuses on environmental cases for two reasons: First, the Tailoring Rule
presents a powerful example of the expanded scope of the absurd results doctrine and its current
relevance in controversial areas such as climate change law. Second, prior environmental cases
involving the absurd results doctrine present a coherent narrative of the doctrine’s expansion and
varied treatment by federal courts over the second half of the twentieth century. While the author
suspects that this critique of the expanded absurd results doctrine would have equal force in other
legal contexts, in-depth discussion of other areas is beyond the scope of this Comment.
27. The Tailoring Rule has inspired more than twenty-five independent challenges in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, many of which attack the EPA’s use of the absurd results doctrine. See
Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. docketed Apr. 2, 2010); see also
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congressionally mandated regulation is absurd as a matter of law.
I.

641
of

COURTS TRADITIONALLY DEFINED “ABSURD RESULTS”
AS OUTCOMES OFFENSIVE TO FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL
VALUES

Based on the presumption that Congress intends to legislate
rationally, courts traditionally employed the absurd results doctrine only
when a literal statutory interpretation would offend fundamental social
values and could not be ascribed to any rational policy choice.28 In this
way, courts justified the absurd results doctrine as a means of
implementing legislative intent.29
A.

Historically, the Absurd Results Doctrine Authorized Departure
from Statutory Text Only When a Literal Interpretation Would
Contravene Fundamental Social Values

The principle that judges should construe statutes to avoid absurd
results is firmly established in the American legal system,30 with origins
traceable to early English common law.31 In the traditional view, the
judicial obligation to apply statutory text is suspended when “the
absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting
the application.”32 As the doctrine developed through the nineteenth
century, courts consistently articulated the concept of legal absurdity in
terms of this moral standard,33 defining an “absurd result” as one that
WANNIER, supra note 3. Although this Comment critiques EPA’s use of the absurd results doctrine
in the Tailoring Rule, it does not advance a position on the litigation nor endorse the petitioners’
arguments attacking the rule, arguments that are designed to avoid any regulation of greenhouse
gases under the CAA.
28. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 98 (distinguishing traditional applications of
the absurd results doctrine from cases in which the court did not identify an affront to fundamental
social values in the statutory text and appeared to consider the competing policy considerations
animating the legislation).
29. See id. at 88.
30. See id. at 85 (describing the absurd results doctrine as “one of the oldest and most wellestablished principles of statutory interpretation”).
31. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) (citing early English
commentators); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 (“[T]he rule is, that where words bear
either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the
received sense of them”).
32. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819).
33. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465–67 (1892) (rejecting as
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offends fundamental social values.34
In the prototypical case United States v. Kirby,35 the U.S. Supreme
Court invoked the absurd results doctrine to overturn a sheriff’s
indictment under a federal statute criminalizing interference with the
passage of the mail.36 The sheriff faced charges for arresting a mail
carrier suspected of murder.37 Though no one disputed that the sheriff’s
detaining the mail carrier violated the letter of the statute, the Court
refused to apply the statute to the facts of the case.38 In the Court’s view,
it defied common sense to prosecute a law enforcement officer for
arresting a murder suspect simply because the suspect was in the
business of delivering the mail.39
The 1889 case of Riggs v. Palmer40 likewise typifies the traditional
formulation of the absurd results doctrine. The plaintiffs in Riggs sought
to invalidate their deceased father’s will insofar as it bequeathed
property to his grandson, who had been found guilty of murdering the
testator to ensure speedy transmission of his inheritance.41 The New
York Court of Appeals conceded that the plain language of the probate
statute prohibited alteration of the will and required a transfer of
property to the murderous grandson.42 Nevertheless, the Court refused to
execute the will43 on the ground that passing property to one who
absurd statutory language deemed offensive to dominant religious values); see also POPKIN, supra
note 21, at 31 (“‘Absurdity’ focuses the judge’s attention on some conception of fundamental values
that the judge should protect” and, according to the nineteenth century understanding, may be
grounds for avoiding “‘absurd,’ not just ‘inconvenient’ results.”) The notable exception to this
moral-referent rule is found in cases involving scrivener’s errors. In such cases, courts invoke the
absurd results doctrine on the ground that drafting mistakes are not attributable to actual
congressional intent, and judges are therefore not bound to enforce them. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 261 (2000).
34. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 88.
35. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482.
36. See id. at 483–84.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 486–87.
39. See id. The Kirby Court defined the concept of legal absurdity primarily by analogy. See id. at
487. It compared the case before it to historical examples of absurd results, such as the prosecution
of a surgeon who aided a person who collapsed in the street under a law punishing anyone who
“drew blood in the streets.” Id. It is noteworthy that the Kirby Court also expressed uncertainty as to
whether the Constitution authorized Congress to pass a statute that would preclude a law
enforcement officer from performing his official duty. Id. at 486. However, its holding ultimately
rested on the absurd results principle. Id. at 486–87.
40. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
41. See id. at 188–89.
42. See id. at 189.
43. See id. at 191.
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murdered the testator constitutes an absurd result.44 Despite the
unambiguous statutory mandate, the result dictated so offended common
morals that the legislature could not have intended it.45
B.

Courts Traditionally Justified the Absurd Results Doctrine as a
Means of Implementing Legislative Intent

As Riggs and Kirby illustrate, courts historically viewed the absurd
results doctrine as a means of implementing legislative intent.46 This
notion, however, appears contradictory: because the text of a statute is
generally considered to be the primary, if not exclusive, expression of
legislative intent,47 it is paradoxical that a judge would refuse to apply
clear text in order to implement that intent.48 The absurd results doctrine,
however, rests on the assumption that Congress would not intend results
that violate fundamental social values and would have altered the
statutory language if it had anticipated the offensive outcome.49
Therefore, where a literal application of a statute would cause an
extreme affront to social or moral standards, a court may properly
conclude that the text reflects “a failure of expression or foresight,”50
instead of genuine legislative intent, so that judicial departure from the
statute “is not [a] substitution of the will of the judge for that of the
44. See id. at 190.
45. See id. at 189–90.
46. See also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting the absurd results principle “demonstrates a respect for the
coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way”); United States v.
Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) (invoking the absurd results doctrine to avoid “blind nullification of
the congressional intent” behind a statute); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892) (a court may invoke the absurd results doctrine when it would be “unreasonable to believe
that the legislator intended to include the particular act” in the statute’s coverage).
47. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of
statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. And where the statutory
language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4 (1980) (stating that a court need not consult
other sources to interpret a statute when the statute’s language is clear); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899) (notwithstanding the
judicial responsibility to enforce the legislature’s will, when judges interpret a statute “[they] do not
inquire what the legislature meant; [they] ask only what the statute means”).
48. Professor Amy Coney Barrett notes that competing constitutional values may permit a federal
court “to depart from the best interpretation of a statute in favor of one that is less plausible yet still
bearable.” Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 163–64 (2010). Yet such
departures are permissible only in the service of defined constitutional values, and in other contexts
“[t]here is no justification for departing from the plain text of a constitutional statute.” Id. at 167.
49. See Manning, supra note 21, at 2389–90.
50. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 88.
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legislator.”51
As demonstrated by traditional absurd results cases, emphasizing
affronts to common morality as the touchstone of legal absurdity limits
the doctrine’s scope. First, it confines the doctrine’s application to
situations in which the challenged interpretation would offend almost
anyone,52 avoiding judicial revision of facially clear statutes where
reasonable minds could differ over the soundness of a literal reading.53
Second, the social norm that signals the absurd result stands in for the
statutory text, defining what the legislature “must have” meant and
limiting the range of possible outcomes once the text is held
inapplicable.54
II.

CONTEMPORARY COURTS HAVE EXPANDED THE
ABSURD RESULTS DOCTRINE TO AVOID ONEROUS
REGULATORY BURDENS

In more recent cases, courts have identified legal absurdities where a
literal statutory interpretation would not offend fundamental social
values.55 Under this expanded reading of the doctrine, courts refuse to
apply a statute literally when it would impose regulatory burdens judged
too onerous to reflect congressional intent.56 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice57 illustrates the
expanded application of the absurd results doctrine.
Public Citizen concerned the applicability of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) to the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary (ABA Committee), which has
advised the President regarding federal judicial nominees for nearly
51. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
52. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing the expanded absurd results doctrine from the
traditional cases in which “applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e.,
where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result . . . and where the alleged
absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.”).
53. See id. at 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court risks
substituting its policy preferences for that of the legislature when it expansively applies the absurd
results doctrine).
54. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
55. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 463–65; Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060,
1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
56. See Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1068 (defining an absurd result not only as one that “is
contrary to common sense,” but also as one that “is inconsistent with the clear intentions of the
statute’s drafters” as determined from “the particular statutory context”).
57. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
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sixty years.58 FACA imposes public disclosure and government
oversight obligations on any advisory committee that is “utilized” by the
President or federal agencies to obtain advice or recommendations.59
Thus, the case turned on whether the executive branch “utilized” the
ABA Committee within the meaning of the statute.60
The parties did not dispute that, in common parlance, the Department
of Justice utilized the ABA Committee to obtain recommendations on
nominees for the federal bench.61 Nevertheless, the Court accepted the
government’s position that a literal application of the statute would be
absurd because it “would catch far more groups and consulting
arrangements than Congress could conceivably have intended.”62 The
Court did not contend that applying FACA to the ABA Committee
according to the statute’s plain meaning would offend social norms.63
Nevertheless, it invoked the absurd results doctrine to narrowly construe
the term “utilize” and avoid reading the statute in a manner deemed
irreconcilable with Congressional intent.64
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Anthony Kennedy forcefully
rejected the majority’s reliance on the absurd results doctrine.65 Justice
Kennedy considered the majority’s broad application of the doctrine an
unjustifiable rejection of clear statutory language, which differed from
traditional absurd results cases.66 He agreed that the majority’s result
58. Id. at 443. The plaintiffs sought access, consistent with FACA’s disclosure requirements, to
the names of potential judicial nominees under consideration by the ABA Committee, as well as the
committee’s reports and meeting minutes. Id. at 447.
59. See id. at 446–47.
60. See id. at 452.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 464–65.
63. See id. at 463–65.
64. See id. at 453 (illustrating with hypotheticals the broad reach that FACA could have if applied
literally and arguing that Congress could not have intended the statute to have such scope). It is
important to note, however, that the Public Citizen Court was straining to avoid the constitutional
question lurking in the case. See id. at 465. The district court had held FACA unconstitutional as
applied to the ABA Committee on the ground that it “infringed unduly on the President’s Article II
power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. at 466. The
Supreme Court, in contrast, repeatedly referenced the principle of constitutional avoidance, which
apparently influenced its decision that FACA did not apply on absurd results grounds. See id. at
465–67 (noting that the principle of constitutional avoidance “tips the balance” against FACA’s
application in the instant case). Thus, it is not clear whether the absurd results analysis in Public
Citizen would fully translate to a case that did not present a constitutional issue.
65. See id. at 467–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Though he rejected the
majority’s reliance on the absurd results doctrine, Justice Kennedy joined the judgment of the Court
on constitutional grounds. Id. at 482.
66. See id. at 470–71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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was “quite sensible.”67 However, he refused to “go along with the
unhealthy process of amending the statute by judicial interpretation,”68
which he considered an affront to the constitutional scheme.69 When the
meaning of a statute is clear and its dictates are constitutional, he argued,
the Court’s only task is to apply the law to the facts of the case.70 Thus,
the inquiry into statutory meaning should have ended once the Court
found that the Executive Branch “utilizes” the ABA Committee “in the
common sense of the word.”71
As is typical of absurd results analyses, 72 however, Justice Kennedy
did not provide a precise definition of legal absurdity. He stated only
that courts should limit the doctrine to cases in which a literal reading of
the statute would be “patently absurd,”73 not merely impractical or even
unconstitutional.74 Notwithstanding this ambiguous definition, he
concluded that the majority in Public Citizen had overreached.75
Rejecting clear statutory text because of a perceived conflict with
legislative intent, and not an indisputable affront to common sense, was
an abuse of the absurd results doctrine.76
III. LITIGATION UNDER FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES EXEMPLIFIES THE EXPANDED APPLICATION
OF THE ABSURD RESULTS DOCTRINE
Litigants have consistently raised absurd results arguments in federal
environmental litigation, relying on an expansive definition of legal
absurdity that departs from the doctrine’s traditional concern with

67. See id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 474 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. Id. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
72. See Dougherty, supra note 24, at 128 (noting that judges who invoke the absurd results
doctrine generally fail to define what constitutes legal absurdity or specify situations in which the
doctrine would properly apply).
73. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 472 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. See id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the absurd results
doctrine “remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary . . . only as long as the Court acts with selfdiscipline” by confining the doctrine to its traditional scope).
76. See id. at 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I believe the Court’s loose
invocation of the ‘absurd result’ canon of statutory construction creates too great a risk that the
Court is exercising its own ‘WILL instead of JUDGMENT,’ with the consequence of ‘substituti[ng]
[its own] pleasure to that of the legislative body.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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fundamental social principles.77 Though the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
an absurd results argument in a 1978 decision interpreting the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),78 litigants continue to invoke the
doctrine in environmental disputes.79 These cases illustrate the doctrine’s
expansion as well as the lack of stable criteria to guide its application.80
They also frame a critical analysis of the Tailoring Rule and its likely
role in defining the future reach of the absurd results doctrine.
A.

The U.S. Supreme Court Refused to Embrace an Expanded
Reading of the Absurd Results Doctrine in TVA v. Hill

In its first case interpreting the ESA, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered the fate of the snail darter, an endangered fish native to the
waters of Eastern Tennessee.81 The defendant Tennessee Valley
Authority argued that a literal application of the ESA’s core provision
would lead to an absurd result,82 namely, halting federal construction of
the multi-million dollar, near-complete Tellico Dam.83 The ESA
provision at issue, section 7(a)(2),84 requires every federal agency to
ensure that any action that it authorizes, funds, or executes will not
jeopardize the survival of any endangered or threatened species or cause
destruction or adverse modification of its critical habitat.85 When
environmental organizations learned that impoundment of water behind
Tellico Dam would wholly eradicate the known habitat of the
endangered snail darter and drive the species to extinction, they sued
under section 7, arguing that its plain language compelled the court to
enjoin the project.86
77. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2001) (raising
absurd results argument in CWA case); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 209 F. Supp. 2d
156, 161–62 (D.D.C. 2002) (National Environmental Policy Act case); Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (Endangered Species Act).
78. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill (TVA v. Hill), 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
79. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Muszynski, 268
F.3d at 98–99; Greater Yellowstone Coal., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 161–62.
80. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 262 (arguing that once a judge identifies a purported
absurdity, the extent and content of statutory revision appropriate to correct it is a question “beyond
precise judicial calibration”).
81. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 158–59.
82. See Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977).
83. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 166. Fifty-three million dollars in public funds had been invested
in the project and the dam was eighty percent complete by the time the case commenced. Id.
84. See id. at 160.
85. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2010).
86. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 164.
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The trial court agreed with the defendant that applying section 7
literally to a near-complete project whose approval pre-dated the ESA’s
enactment would be absurd as a matter of law.87 The court noted
disapprovingly that a strict construction of section 7 would require “a
court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an
endangered species were discovered in the river on the day
before . . . .”88 However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s judgment, rejecting the absurd results argument.89 Finding a
blatant statutory violation, the appellate court refused to engage in an
independent balancing of dollars versus species, which Congress had
already done in enacting section 7.90 In language prescient of Justice
Kennedy’s anti-absurdity argument in Public Citizen, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that declining to apply the statute on absurdity grounds would
exceed the bounds of the judicial role.91 Because “[c]urrent project status
cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial review,” the
court’s function was limited to “preserv[ing] the status quo where
endangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative
or executive branches sufficient opportunity to grapple with the
alternatives.”92 Despite the concededly extreme consequences of
enjoining completion of the dam, the court refused to depart from the
plain language of the statute.93
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.94 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren Burger admitted uncertainty regarding Congress’s actual
intent that section 7 apply unbendingly to the case of the Tellico Dam.95
Nevertheless, he could identify no legitimate basis for departing from
the plain language of the statute, observing that “neither the Endangered
Species Act nor Art[icle] III of the Constitution provides federal courts
with authority to make such fine utilitarian calculations” where the
statute clearly reflects congressional intent to prioritize species
87. See Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (stating that
Congress could not possibly have intended for section 7 to apply literally to the Tellico Dam).
88. Id.
89. See Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977).
90. See id. at 1071.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1069.
94. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill (TVA v. Hill), 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978). Though the majority
opinion does not explicitly discuss the absurd results doctrine, its analysis tracks that of the
appellate court and implicitly rejects the defendant’s absurdity argument.
95. See id. at 187 (acknowledging the argument that “the burden on the public through the loss of
millions of unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter”).
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protection:96
Here we are urged to view the Endangered Species Act
“reasonably,” and hence shape a remedy that “accords with
some modicum of common sense and the public weal.” But is
that our function? We have no expert knowledge on the subject
of endangered species, much less do we have a mandate from
the people to strike a balance of equities on the side of the
Tellico Dam. Congress has spoken in the plainest of words,
making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in
favor of affording endangered species the highest of
priorities . . . .97
The Court repudiated the central justification for the absurd results
doctrine—the notion that judges need an escape hatch from clear
statutory language when they feel that Congress would have chosen
different words if it had anticipated the present circumstances.98 The
Court acknowledged that the ESA failed to precisely address section 7’s
applicability to a major federal project so near to completion.99 Yet this
did not warrant recourse to other indicia of congressional purpose that
might temper the textual directive.100
Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning accords with scholarly arguments
that the absurd results doctrine is ineffective, and therefore unjustifiable,
as a means of implementing legislative intent.101 Yet the Court’s opinion

96. Id.
97. Id. at 194 (internal citations omitted). The Chief Justice noted that Congress had passed a
series of more flexible statutes aimed at species protection prior to enacting the ESA. Id. at 174–77.
Each time, it found that more stringent regulation was needed, as the countervailing forces of
economic development and vested industrial interests were simply too strong to protect vulnerable
species with a half-hearted approach. Id. This history—which is strikingly similar to that of the
CAA, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 490–93 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (describing legislative history of the CAA and its amendments)—
undermined the notion that judicial revision of the statutory text could be consistent with legislative
intent. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
98. See id. at 194–95 (“Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are
we vested with the power of veto.”).
99. See id. at 185 (“It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have
altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.”).
100. See id. at 187 (noting but rejecting argument that the immense public burden of halting
construction on the dam would be irreconcilable with congressional intent).
101. See Manning, supra note 21, at 2390 (arguing that judicial attempts to divine the
congressional intent behind statutory text are futile, since the text is the product of political
compromise and not a coherent expression of legislative will); Dougherty, supra note 24, at 132
(arguing that judges applying the absurd results doctrine “give a nod to legislative supremacy while
actually responding to some other authority entirely”).
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in TVA v. Hill has not discouraged expansive application of the doctrine,
even in the environmental arena. Agencies and regulated parties
continue to argue that statutes imposing significant economic or
administrative burdens are absurd as a matter of law, and some of these
arguments have gained traction in the courts.102
B.

A Circuit Split on the Meaning of “Daily” in the Clean Water Act
Illustrates the Inconsistent Application of the Absurd Results
Doctrine

The Clean Water Act (CWA) is one of several federal environmental
statutes whose application has been challenged under the absurd results
doctrine.103 The CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants to waters of
the United States,104 primarily through “end-of-the-pipe” technologybased controls on sources such as industrial facilities and wastewater
treatment plants.105 Where such controls are inadequate to maintain
ambient water quality standards, section 303 of the CWA requires the
EPA or authorized state agencies to establish “total maximum daily
loads” (TMDLs) for pollutants whose levels exceed the applicable
standards.106 A TMDL prescribes the maximum quantity of a pollutant
that may be discharged into a particular water body on a daily basis, and
it must be set “at a level necessary to implement the applicable water
quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety . . . .”107

102. Both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have since embraced absurd results
arguments, both within and beyond the context of environmental law. See, e.g., United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242–43 (1989) (interpreting bankruptcy statute); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1981) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (interpreting Federal
Rules of Evidence); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2001)
(interpreting CWA); Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting
CWA); Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (interpreting Safe
Drinking Water Act). But see W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 168–
69 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting absurd results argument in CWA case); Friends of the Earth v. EPA,
446 F.3d 140, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting absurd results argument in CWA case); Greater
Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 209 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161–63 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting absurd
results argument raised under the National Environmental Policy Act).
103. See cases cited supra note 77.
104. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1362(7) (2010).
105. See id. § 1342. End-of-the-pipe controls, which include chemical treatment or filtering,
remediate contaminated wastewater before it is released into the environment. Such approaches may
be contrasted with mandatory process changes, such as a prohibition on dioxin use in paper
processing, which would alter the inputs to the waste stream instead of seeking to remediate the
waste before it is disposed into the environment. See Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 94.
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
107. Id.
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During the past decade, the Courts of Appeals for both the Second
and D.C. Circuits have considered whether the CWA requires agencies
to establish TMDLs exclusively in terms of daily discharges, or whether
limits based on seasonal, annual, or other increments satisfy the statutory
mandate.108 In both cases, the EPA argued against a literal application of
the term “daily” on the ground that requiring TMDLs exclusively in
daily terms would lead to absurd results.109 Though faced with
essentially identical issues and arguments, the courts split in their
holdings and in their treatment of the absurd results doctrine.110
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Muszynski, environmental
advocates challenged the EPA’s approval of TMDLs for eight New York
State reservoirs that expressed phosphorous discharge limitations in
annual, not daily, terms.111 The Natural Resources Defense Council
argued that establishing total maximum daily loads based on annual
discharges violated the plain language of the CWA.112 The Second
Circuit, however, found this literal reading absurd and upheld the EPA’s
approval of the annual New York standards.113 The court noted that the
EPA and state agencies develop TMDLs for a broad range of pollutants,
some of which concededly require regulation through daily discharge
limitations because they cause significant environmental damage in
small quantities.114 But the court reasoned that daily limits may not be
necessary for pollutants whose impact on water quality is less
immediate,115 notwithstanding the statute’s call for “total maximum
daily loads.”116 The EPA’s argument in Muszynski is similar to its
position in the Tailoring Rule; in both cases, it argued that the regulatory
approach prescribed by Congress should not apply to a specific pollutant
that the agency believes could be more efficiently controlled by a
different method.117
108. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 142; Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 96.
109. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146; Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 98.
110. Compare Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 98–99 (accepting absurd results argument), with Friends of
the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146 (rejecting absurd results argument).
111. See Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 96.
112. See id. at 97.
113. See id. at 98–99.
114. See id. at 98.
115. See id. at 98–99.
116. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
117. Compare id. at 98 (noting that the CWA requires establishment of TMDLs for “an openended range of pollutants,” some of which may be effectively regulated via discharge limitations
measured in non-daily terms), with Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,517 (describing how
statutory permitting thresholds generally applicable to pollutants regulated under the CAA would be
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument when it
considered a similar challenge to TMDLs in 2006.118 In Friends of the
Earth v. EPA,119 an environmental organization sought review of
TMDLs that prescribed annual limits for oxygen-depleting pollutants
and seasonal limits for pollutants contributing to turbidity in the
Anacostia River in Washington, D.C.120 The D.C. Circuit observed that
“[d]aily means daily, nothing else,” and held that the EPA could not
avoid the literal mandate of section 303 on absurdity grounds.121 The
court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Muszynski, finding that
the range of pollutants for which the EPA must set or approve TMDLs
does not render a literal reading of “daily” absurd.122 Rather, the court
found in section 303 neither a hint of congressionally authorized
flexibility nor legitimate textual ambiguity that called for construction
by the agency.123
Like Justice Kennedy in Public Citizen, the D.C. Circuit did not insist
on a wholesale abandonment of the absurd results doctrine.124 Instead,
the court held that the EPA failed to make the requisite showing that
mandating TMDLs in exclusively daily terms could not possibly reflect
congressional intent.125 The court was unwilling to accept the EPA’s
absurdity argument because section 303 squarely addressed the issue at
hand and its requirement of daily discharge limitations was effective for
many pollutants.126 Simply put, the court refused to accept that the
unmanageable in the case of greenhouse gases).
118. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Interestingly, the court framed
the issue slightly differently than the Second Circuit had, asking “whether the word ‘daily,’ as used
in the CWA, is sufficiently pliant to mean a measure of time other than daily,” thereby permitting
EPA to comply with section 303 by setting seasonal or annual pollutant limits. Id. at 142. The
Second Circuit, by contrast, had asked whether EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act by
approving TMDLs that were deficient for non-compliance with section 303. Muszynski, 268 F.3d at
96–97.
119. 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
120. See id. at 142–43.
121. See id. at 142 (“If EPA believes using daily loads for certain types of pollutants has
undesirable consequences, then it must either amend its regulation designating all pollutants as
‘suitable’ for daily loads or take its concerns to Congress.”).
122. See id. at 146.
123. See id. at 144 (“The law says ‘daily.’ We see nothing ambiguous about this command.
‘Daily’ connotes ‘every day.’”).
124. See id. at 146 (discussing parameters of absurd results doctrine).
125. See id.
126. See id. (“Here, EPA has failed to make . . . a showing [of absurd results] for a simple
reason . . . establishing daily loads makes perfect sense for many pollutants. Given this . . . we see
no way to conclude that as a matter of logic and statutory structure, [Congress] almost surely could
not have meant to require daily loads.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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absurd results doctrine allows an agency to “avoid the Congressional
intent clearly expressed in the text simply by asserting that its preferred
approach would be better policy.”127
IV. COURTS SHOULD LIMIT THE ABSURD RESULTS
DOCTRINE TO ITS TRADITIONAL SCOPE
As discussed above, decisions such as Public Citizen and Muszynski
illustrate the expansion of the absurd results doctrine. In contrast to the
traditional understanding, expanded application of the doctrine allows
judges to reject unambiguous legislation that they perceive as unduly
burdensome.128 The EPA’s Tailoring Rule may represent the broadest
interpretation of the absurd results doctrine to date, as it revises
unambiguous, numerical statutory standards despite the agency’s
concession that Congress intended the CAA to apply to greenhouse
gases.129
Courts should reject the expansive conception of the absurd results
doctrine invoked in the Tailoring Rule. First, such a broad reading of the
doctrine is inconsistent with constitutional separation of powers
principles, the Chevron doctrine of agency statutory interpretation, and
the mandate of federal environmental statutes. Second, when addressing
unmanageable regulatory burdens, administrative agencies possess
alternative tools that do not require revision of clear legislation; these
include the administrative necessity doctrine, de minimis exemptions,
general permits, and the ability to lobby Congress for legislative change.
Finally, the fact that the Tailoring Rule concerns the first federal attempt
to regulate climate-changing greenhouse gas emissions adds importance
to the task of clarifying and limiting the reach of the absurd results
doctrine.
A.

The Tailoring Rule Exemplifies the Expanded Reach of the Absurd
Results Doctrine and its Inconsistency with Separation of Powers
and Administrative Law Norms

The EPA’s absurd results justification for the Tailoring Rule differs
from past uses of the doctrine in that the statutory text at issue is neither

127. Id. at 145 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
128. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the
absurd results doctrine may enable a court to avoid “pointless burdens on regulated entities”).
129. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,517 (noting “clear congressional intent” that the PSD
and title V permitting programs apply to sources of greenhouse gases).
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general nor ambiguous, but consists of explicit numerical criteria
establishing permitting requirements.130 This signals a significant break
from the traditional understanding of the absurd results doctrine, under
which only “[g]eneral terms should be so limited in their application so
as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.”131
Even more recent cases such as Public Citizen, which expand the
definition of legal absurdity beyond its traditional moral focus, have
rested on some perceived textual ambiguity.132
By allowing agencies to reject unambiguous statutory text like that at
issue in the Tailoring Rule, courts embracing an expansive reading of the
absurd results doctrine violate separation of powers principles. As
Justice Kennedy argued in Public Citizen, agency revision of duly
enacted statutes impermissibly usurps legislative authority,133 regardless
of its practical expediency. When a court embraces an agency’s
absurdity argument, it exacerbates the separation of powers violation by
effectively restricting congressional authority to select a regulatory
approach.134 Reliance on the absurd results doctrine also offends
fundamental rule of law norms by facilitating ad hoc exemptions from
130. See id. at 31,514 (explaining that the Tailoring Rule’s purpose is to address the applicability
of the CAA’s 100/250-tons-per-year permitting threshold to stationary sources of greenhouse
gases). Cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452 (1989) (accepting absurd results
argument where the key statutory term—“utilize”—was “a wooly verb, its contours left undefined
by the statute”); Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 98 (accepting absurd results argument on the ground that
petitioner’s literal construction was “overly narrow” and the key statutory term was “susceptible to
a broader range of meanings”); Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (accepting absurd results argument to support agency’s interpretation of the undefined term
“feasible” in provision containing no numerical triggers or guidelines).
131. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486–87 (1868) (emphasis added); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law 4 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 158 (2002)) (arguing that the absurd results doctrine is an appropriate remedy
for dealing with “excessive generality” in statutory text).
132. See Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452 (describing key statutory term as “wooly”); Muszynski,
268 F.3d at 98 (authorizing agency’s use of seasonal or annual pollutant discharge limitations to
satisfy statutory requirement for “total maximum daily loads” on the ground that “daily” as used in
the statute is sufficiently flexible to embrace “a broader range of meanings” than a strictly diurnal
measure).
133. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 262 (critiquing
traditional applications of absurd results doctrine and arguing that, where appropriate, troublesome
statutes should be held unconstitutional instead of “absurd”); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Climate
Change and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 111, 117 (2007) (noting Supreme Court precedents
mandating agency fidelity to clear statutory text).
134. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 137 (observing that, under the absurd results doctrine,
“legislators will not be allowed to intend an absurdity, or, even if they do, the courts will not enforce
it”); see also POPKIN, supra note 21, at 268 (“Contemporary rationality analysis in constitutional
law argues against courts refusing to defer to a statute that would otherwise pass muster under the
rational basis test.”).
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laws of general application.135
In addition, the expanded absurd results doctrine allows agencies to
circumvent the framework for agency statutory construction established
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron.136 Under Chevron, an agency
that establishes genuine ambiguity in the statutory text may adopt a
reasonable construction based on its interpretation of congressional
intent.137 Where, however, the statute is clear on its face, the inquiry into
statutory meaning begins and ends with the text; the court will not
inquire into the agency’s interpretation but will apply the statute as
written.138 Under a broad reading of the absurd results doctrine,
however, an agency that fails to demonstrate ambiguity in a statute may
nevertheless adopt an independent construction of the statutory text.139
In the Tailoring Rule, for example, the EPA does not dispute Congress’s
intent that the CAA apply to greenhouse gases, but instead attacks as
absurd the regulatory approach mandated in the law.140 In such
circumstances, the agency operates outside the normal Chevron process,
and a court’s revision of complex regulatory legislation to accommodate
the agency’s interpretation constitutes precisely the type of “fine
utilitarian calculations” that the U.S. Supreme Court has found to exceed
the federal judicial power.141

135. See Manning, supra note 21, at 2393. But see Dougherty, supra note 24, at 134 (arguing that
strict literalism undermines the rule of law value of coherence in the legal system, since “a legal
interpretation that results in absurdity is likely to offend some other legal principle”).
136. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Some courts have conflated the Chevron analysis with the absurd results argument. See, e.g.,
Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that where a literal
application of a statute would produce absurd results, the provision at issue “simply has no plain
meaning . . . and is the proper subject of construction by EPA and the court” (internal quotations
omitted)). The EPA similarly presents the two doctrines as interrelated in the Tailoring Rule, supra
note 4, at 31,533. However, the agency concedes that there is clear evidence of Congress’s intent
that the relevant provisions of the CAA apply to regulation of greenhouse gases. Id. at 31,517.
Therefore, EPA relies on the absurd results doctrine to depart from concededly unambiguous
statutory text. Id. at 31,533 (describing absurd results doctrine as an exception to the general rule of
Chevron that an agency must follow clear statutory text that addresses the question at issue).
140. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,517 (noting “clear congressional intent” that PSD and
title V permitting programs apply to sources of greenhouse gases); id. at 31,517 (asserting that “the
costs to sources and administrative burdens to permitting authorities that would result from
application of the PSD and title V programs . . . at the statutory levels . . . should be considered
‘absurd results’”).
141. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).
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An Expanded Absurd Results Doctrine Threatens the Effectiveness
of Regulatory Statutes

On a practical level, an expanded absurd results doctrine threatens the
efficacy of regulatory statutes such as the CAA by allowing nonlegislative actors to invalidate applicable statutory provisions by
claiming that their administrative burdens are legally absurd. In effect,
the likelihood of judicial rejection of clear legislation increases with the
seriousness of the problem presented, as Congress’s regulatory response
will tend to be most obtrusive where the statute concerns a particularly
urgent or pervasive issue.
Climate change illustrates this phenomenon. By definition, regulatory
responses to climate change will be far-reaching.142 Granting courts
authority to invalidate legislation that addresses climate impacts on
absurdity grounds, regardless of a clear statutory mandate, could
preclude federal regulation of climate change and statutory remedies for
climate-related harms.143 Moreover, this displacement of legislation
could occur in the absence of clear criteria for finding or addressing a
purported absurdity.144 As a result, courts and agencies will have
unfettered authority to set the regulatory agenda and revise or reject
environmental statutes that, by their terms, apply to the impacts of
climate change.145
Allowing non-legislative actors to revise statutory standards is
particularly troubling in the context of the CAA, as Congress structured
the legislation with the explicit aim of making it adaptable to new
challenges.146 Moreover, to effectuate the CAA’s strong public health
142. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010, AT 1–4 (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140636.pdf (discussing the need for
aggressive regulatory responses to climate change and summarizing initiatives undertaken by the
Obama Administration).
143. On the other hand, it is important to note that judicial fidelity to the literal meaning of a
statute does not always advance the statute’s goals. See, e.g, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 732–35 (2006) (applying dictionary definitions of the jurisdictional terms in the CWA to
severely curtail federal regulatory authority to protect wetlands); Norman A. Dupont, “Plain
Meaning” Construction of Environmental Statutes, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 66 (2006).
144. See Dougherty, supra note 24, at 139 (noting that cases invoking the absurd results doctrine
fail to define what outcomes qualify as legally “absurd”).
145. See Barrett, supra note 48, at 111–12 (contrasting the absurd results doctrine with
constitutionally based canons of construction that “draw from an identifiable, closed set of norms”
instead of “undifferentiated social values”).
146. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (stating that, though the Congress that
enacted the CAA might not have been expressly concerned with regulation of greenhouse gases,
“they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific
developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language . . . reflects an
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and environmental mandate, courts have consistently, if controversially,
interpreted the Act to clearly limit the areas in which EPA may exercise
regulatory discretion and the factors it may consider when doing so.147
Accordingly, the Tailoring Rule demonstrates how an unconstrained
absurd results doctrine undermines the purpose and operation of a
carefully crafted statutory scheme.
C.

Agencies Possess Alternative Means to Address Conflicts Between
Statutory Directives and Practical Regulatory Challenges

The voluminous legal challenges to the Tailoring Rule attest to the
difficulties that the EPA faces in satisfying its statutory obligations in
the face of competing economic and political realities.148 The present
controversy surrounding the rule likely anticipates many more situations
in which the uniquely pervasive effects of climate change will cause
clashes between the scale of regulation needed to forestall catastrophic
impacts and the practical obstacles to implementation.149
However, these practical considerations do not resolve the doctrinal
issues that an expanded absurd results doctrine presents. Moreover,
limiting the doctrine to its traditional scope would not leave agencies
without recourse. The established doctrine of administrative necessity
and the strategies of de minimis exemptions and general permits may, in
appropriate circumstances, allow an agency to ease its administrative
burden without engaging in reinterpretation of facially clear statutes.
Agencies also have the option of attempting to implement the statutory
directive while pressuring Congress to revisit the issue.
In limited circumstances, the administrative necessity doctrine
excuses an agency’s failure to immediately comply with an
intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.”); see also
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Environmental Laws of the 1970s: They Looked Good on Paper, 12
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1–42 (forthcoming 2011).
147. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (holding that section 109 of
the CAA, which requires EPA to set national ambient air quality standards “requisite to protect the
public health with an adequate margin of safety,” does not permit EPA to consider implementation
costs). The American Trucking Court described the public health mandate expressed in section 109
as “absolute.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. For a discussion of the issues facing EPA in its attempts to address climate change using
federal statutes enacted before climate change was widely understood, see generally George F.
Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The
Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 919 (2010); see
also Editorial, A Coming Assault on the E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2010, at A28.
149. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 2:09-cv-00670-JCC
(W.D. Wash. filed May 14, 2009), 2009 WL 1390743 (challenging EPA’s alleged failure to regulate
climate change impacts on marine water quality under the CWA).
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unmanageable statutory directive.150 The EPA already relies on
administrative necessity as part of its suite of justifications for the
Tailoring Rule.151 Unlike the absurd results doctrine, administrative
necessity claims do not involve agency or judicial revision of
unambiguous statutory text. On the contrary, an agency invoking
administrative necessity must find that the language of the statute means
what it says, while assuming that Congress intends statutes to be
administrable.152 This assumption justifies the agency’s acknowledgment
that it cannot immediately comply with the statutory directive, though it
must continue working toward full implementation.153 The distinction is
significant, as the administrative necessity analysis avoids independent
agency construction of unambiguous legislation. It also confines the
scope of administrative and judicial discretion by focusing on the statute
as the source of legislative intent, instead of an open set of social norms.
In addition, the administrative necessity doctrine requires that the agency
develop and adhere to a schedule of full compliance with the statutory
mandate.154
An agency facing unmanageable regulatory burdens may also have
the option of promulgating a de minimis exemption from the statutory
requirement at issue. Based on the premise that the law does not concern
itself with trivialities, a de minimis exemption relieves the agency’s
obligation to formally regulate entities that are captured by the statutory
text but do not make a meaningful contribution to the problem the law
seeks to address.155 Unless the legislative design implies otherwise, an
agency generally possesses a narrow authority to promulgate a de
150. See Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Considerations of
administrative necessity may be a basis for finding implied authority for an administrative approach
not explicitly provided in the statute” where “the conventional course . . . would, as a practical
matter, prevent the agency from carrying out the mission assigned to it by Congress.”).
151. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 4, at 31,576–78.
152. See id. at 31,577. Understood this way, one could argue that the EPA’s tandem invocation of
absurd results and administrative necessity is contradictory: the former assumes that Congress did
not intend to regulate small sources of greenhouse gases under title V and PSD, while the latter
assumes that Congress did so intend but the agency requires flexibility in implementing that
directive.
153. See id. (noting that, when applying the administrative necessity doctrine, an agency must
“develop what is in effect a compliance schedule with the statutory requirements, under which the
agency will implement the statute as much as administratively possible and as quickly as
administratively possible.”).
154. Id.
155. See Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360–61. But see Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress adopted an “extraordinarily rigid” position in its
proscription of FDA approval of carcinogenic color additives under the FDCA, a position that
precluded a de minimis exemption).
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minimis exemption “when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of
trivial or no value.”156
Certain statutory schemes also allow for the issuance of general
permits applicable to a class of similarly situated facilities,157 which can
obviate the need for individual assessment of thousands of entities in a
single sector.158 For example, the EPA currently utilizes general permits
to regulate construction sites under the CWA, as such sites are receptive
to common pollution-control strategies and are so numerous that
individual permitting would be a formidable challenge.159 When the
statutory scheme allows, general permits enable an agency to regulate all
of the entities that Congress intended to reach at a significantly reduced
administrative cost.
Finally, agencies retain the option of making a good-faith effort to
apply the law as written while pressuring Congress to amend the
statute.160 Admittedly, climate change has engendered considerable
political controversy, resulting in legislative stalemate.161 However,
Congress has demonstrated its ability to amend environmental laws to
address emerging issues.162 For example, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
156. Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360–61. However, the court in Alabama Power was careful to point
out that the de minimis doctrine does not authorize an administrative exemption from statutory
requirements based on the agency’s assessment that the burdens of regulation do not outweigh the
benefits. See id. at 361.
157. In the CAA context, for example, general permits could be issued under title V but not under
the PSD program, as the latter is source-specific by design.
158. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting
EPA’s administrative infeasibility argument to support a wholesale exemption of several source
categories from CWA permitting requirements and noting the availability of general permits as a
permissible alternative for relieving the agency’s administrative burden).
159. See EPA, NPDES General Permit for Stormwater Discharges From Construction Activities
(Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cgp2008_finalpermit.pdf. It should be noted,
however, that general permits are not without their critics, and are far from perfect as a resolution of
the conflict between administrative burdens and statutory commands. See generally Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 409 (2007) (arguing that EPA’s CWA general permits procedures have numerous and
significant legal deficiencies).
160. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978) (questioning whether Congress
intended the loss of millions of dollars in public funds to save an endangered species, but applying
the statutory text to preserve the status quo and allow Congress to make any necessary changes to
the statute).
161. See Jonas Monast et al., Avoiding the Glorious Mess: A Sensible Approach to Climate
Change and the Clean Air Act 1 (Oct. 2010) (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Duke Univ.,
working paper), available at
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/avoiding-the-glorious-mess.
162. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 503–06 (6th ed. 2009) (describing series of major amendments to the CAA from the 1970s–
90s); id. at 266–67 (discussing series of major amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act to
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decision in TVA v. Hill, Congress revised section 7 of the ESA to include
a limited hardship exemption that could be invoked to avoid the
provision’s rigid “no jeopardy” mandate if authorized by a high-level
committee.163 Though the committee has never fully exempted a
project,164 the Court’s refusal to enact a judicial exemption to the statute
and Congress’s subsequent move to do so demonstrate the viability of
this approach.
Although these strategies might not fully resolve the EPA’s quandary
over greenhouse gas regulation, they demonstrate that restricting the
scope of the absurd results doctrine in future cases would not relegate
agencies and courts to being “helpless slaves to literalism.”165 The
existence of alternatives makes the practical necessity argument for
expanding the absurd results doctrine unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
The history of the absurd results doctrine—particularly its use in
federal environmental litigation from TVA v. Hill through the present
suits challenging the Tailoring Rule—illustrates its expansion and
inconsistent treatment by the federal courts. Broad application of the
doctrine allows agencies and judges to engage in independent
construction of unambiguous legislation in violation of administrative
law and separation of powers principles. As the divergent results in the
environmental cases illustrate, the absurd results doctrine facilitates this

address administrative challenges). Notably, Congress has at other times declined the opportunity to
revise statutory mandates and regulatory structures despite EPA’s claim of administrative
impossibility in the courts. See id. at 689 (noting that Congress left largely intact the CWA
permitting requirements that the EPA described as administratively impossible in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977), except as to a single source category).
Thus, the challenges that climate change presents are not—insofar as they raise issues of multibranch environmental governance—entirely novel.
163. See PERCIVAL, supra note 162, at 948.
164. See id.
165. Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Professors Manning and
Stephenson argue that alternative substantive canons could even obviate the need to apply the
absurd results doctrine in the traditional cases in which a literal statutory application would offend a
fundamental social or moral principle. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 11, at 101. For
example, they note that the Kirby Court could have reached the same result by applying the
established principle that criminal prohibitions are generally inapplicable to reasonable enforcement
actions by the police. Id. Such alternative canons are preferable to absurd results because they
provide a defined set of governing principles to guide judicial discretion. Id.; see also Barrett, supra
note 48, at 111–12 (distinguishing constitutionally derived substantive canons from those that rely
on “undifferentiated social values”). However, this author is satisfied to advocate rejection of the
expanded absurd results doctrine and leave a more comprehensive critique for another day.
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controversial phenomenon without providing meaningful criteria to
constrain interpretive discretion.
The EPA’s absurd results justification for the Tailoring Rule stretches
the concept of legal absurdity in new ways by applying it to
unambiguous, numerical statutory standards while conceding Congress’s
intent that the CAA cover greenhouse gas emissions. If accepted by the
courts, this broad definition of absurd results would threaten the
effective functioning of regulatory statutes such as the CAA by enabling
non-legislative actors to declare a certain degree of statutorily mandated
regulation absurd as a matter of law. As the country grapples with the
specter of climate change and political stalemate on how to address it,
the practical impact could be severe.
In the end, the Tailoring Rule may well stand on the other doctrinal
foundations constructed by the EPA. Whether that would be “good” with
respect to U.S. climate policy is open to debate. However, the doctrinal
problems with upholding the rule on absurdity grounds are apparent: the
inconsistency with constitutional and administrative law principles, the
lack of criteria for identifying and addressing an absurd result, and the
potential for an expanded doctrine to undermine environmental
governance strongly support rejection of the EPA’s absurd results
argument in the Tailoring Rule and a clear restriction on the doctrine’s
scope.

